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AbStRACt When the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) was
imposed on Ontario’s university campuses in 2006, faculty and students were made to look
closely at their own habits and to reconsider campus traditions relating to privacy. The back-
drop to the legislation is a complex matrix of campus relations, policy, sharing of health in-
formation, and the use and abuse of information and communication technologies. Part 1 of
this article examines the recent history of privacy in general and privacy on campus in On-
tario, Canada, and the United States. Part 2 reports the outcome of a series of focus groups
held on two Ontario university campuses in which faculty and undergraduate students were
asked about their perceptions of privacy on campus and their knowledge and comprehension
of FIPPA.
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RéSUMé  Quand on a imposé la Loi sur l’accès à l’information et la protection de la vie privée
(LAIPVP) sur les campus universitaires de l’Ontario en 2006, le personnel enseignant et les
étudiants ont dû réﬂéchir longuement sur leurs propres habitudes et reconsidérer les
pratiques universitaires portant sur la vie privée. Dans les universités, un enchevêtrement
complexe comportant des relations interpersonnelles, des politiques, le partage
d’informations sur la santé et l’utilisation et l’abus de technologies de l'information et de la
communication sous-tend cette législation. La première partie de cet article examine l’histoire
récente de la vie privée en général ainsi que celle de la vie privée sur des campus en Ontario
et aux États-Unis. La seconde partie rapporte les résultats d’une série de groupes de discussion
menés sur deux campus universitaires en Ontario lors desquels des étudiants de premier
cycle et des enseignants ont répondu à des questions sur leurs perceptions de la vie privée à
l’université et leur connaissance et compréhension de la LAIPVP. 
MOtS CLéS Vie privée; Loi/législation; LAIPVP; LPRPS; Nouveaux médias; Groupes de
discussion
In June 2006, the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) be-came law for Ontario universities. the legislation created new rules for the collection,
handling, and disclosure of information on campus. Some students, faculty, and staff
struggled with the complexity of the legislation. More signiﬁcantly, the legislation led
to a  new perception that privacy itself is complex and fraught with paradox. As I dis-
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covered when I conducted focus groups on campus, the introduction of FIPPA high-
lighted contradictory attitudes to privacy for people who value privacy but give away
their most intimate personal information, particularly online, in capitalist market-ex-
change arrangements. In concert with other legislation, FIPPA allows the disclosure
of otherwise sacrosanct health information at times of crisis for the sake of saving lives.
the introduction of FIPPA drew attention to the implications of online storage in the
United States of Canadians’ private information, such as academic research queries,
where all information is subject to government surveillance under the USA Patriot
Act. this article investigates the reception of FIPPA on campuses required to adopt
a  universally applied policymaking instrument. FIPPA’s implementation led Ontario
university administrations to review and revise now outdated or inconsistent privacy
policies. It also required universities to explain the new legislation, a  task that proved
to be unexpectedly difﬁcult.
this article is composed of two parts. the ﬁrst part considers privacy policy and
legislation in Canada and the United States (especially since September  11, 2001) and
the contested meanings of privacy itself. this section also considers the effects of new
media and online social networks, also known as social networking sites (SNSs), such
as MySpace and Facebook. SNSs are popular with university students, who do not ap-
pear to recognize the potential dangers of freely exchanging personal information on
such services. the article also investigates whether Canadian and U.S. policies regarding
the disclosure of personal legislation are adequately interpreted in times of crisis. the
second part of the article describes perceptions about privacy on campus by interpreting
the outcome of a  series of focus groups held in 2008-09 on two very different Ontario
university campuses. I embarked on my documentary analysis and focus group inter-
views with the following positive assumptions: Faculty thought the legislation was nec-
essary; students and faculty would understand FIPPA; the legislation had been
introduced through a well-organized process; focus group participants would, therefore,
be informed enough to help make and explain policy on their campuses.
Despite my original assumptions, I discovered that the implementation of FIPPA
was perceived to have been confusing and incomplete by many faculty and students.
there were differences in the comprehension and reception on the two campuses as
well as between the two cohorts of faculty and students.
What does FIPPA do?
According to the legislation, 
the purposes of this Act are,
(a) to provide a  right of access to information under the control of institutions
in accordance with the principles that,
(i) information should be available to the public,
(ii) necessary exemptions from the right of access should be limited and
speciﬁc, and
(iii) decisions on the disclosure of government information should be
reviewed independently of government; and
(b) to protect the privacy of individuals with respect to personal information
about themselves held by institutions and to provide individuals with a right
of access to that information. (Ontario, FIPPA, 2010, s.  1)
the Act requires that a provincial privacy commissioner work at arm’s length
from government to respond to freedom of information requests and breaches of pri-
vacy.1 there is also a federal commissioner whose role is somewhat different.2
Why study the reception of FIPPA, and how?
Like all democratic legislation, FIPPA is the result of a  formal undertaking designed to
guide social action, including policymaking. Ideal civil society responses to policy issues
include giving voice to as many persons as possible, as Parsons makes clear when he
speaks of policy “critical theorists”3 who:
envisage policy analysis as an activity which should be informed by a  radical
commitment to social change and equality as a  prerequisite for improving
decision-making. Critical policy analysis advocates a fundamental and far-
reaching shift towards a more open decision-making process and the empow-
ering of citizens, rather than improving the way in which decision-makers
use information and knowledge.4 (1995, p.  444)
An analysis of FIPPA requires that research be conducted within the context of
“privacy studies” (see bennett, 2008; bennett & Grant, 1999; Cavoukian, 2005, 2009;
Rule, 2007; Schoeman, 1984; Shade, 2008). the study of FIPPA’s reception is also im-
portant in the light of how Ontario universities responded to the Council of Universi-
ties’ attempts to regulate freedom of information (FOI) in the spirit of FIPPA, which
met with little success. Some universities completely ignored the request to adopt FOI
policies, including one of the two where I held my focus groups, while others replied
in an uneven fashion. this was made clear in the Ontario College and University Fac-
ulty Association’s (OCUFA) report Restricted Entry: Access to Information at Ontario
Universities (2004). to help overcome the problem that universities would not respond
favourably to OCUFA’s request to accept FOI policies, FIPPA was made law.
Given the fragility of privacy in the public sphere, particularly since the advent
and convergence of contemporary information and communication technologies
(ICts), it is also necessary to conduct research in light of “surveillance studies” (see
Lyon, 1994, 2006, 2007; Rule, 1974; Whitaker, 1999).
Development of FIPPA
FIPPA was informed by policies and practices developed in other jurisdictions where
similar privacy legislation for universities was already in place (for example, in most
Canadian provinces, although New brunswick’s privacy laws do not currently cover
universities, and in many U.S. states, Australia, and the U.K.). In addition, the 10-point
Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information (ﬁrst published in 1996), de-
veloped by the Canadian Standards Association (CSA), helped Canadian and interna-
tional legislators develop a  variety of privacy laws and policies. Examples of the CSA’s
impact on the collection, handling, and disclosure of personal information, besides
FIPPA, include Canada’s federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Doc-
uments Act (Canada, PIPEDA, 2000), to which the CSA code is appended.
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before FIPPA the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA), which reg-
ulates the disclosure of private health information, had been applicable to universities
since its implementation in 2004. but, unlike FIPPA, the implementation of PHIPA
did not arouse widespread confusion. the province’s intention was to clarify privacy
issues in a consistent way by implementing FIPPA and PHIPA on campus.
Prior to implementing FIPPA and PHIPA legislation, Ontario universities had no
common policies for guaranteeing access to institutional information (such as whether
animal experimentation is taking place) or for protecting the privacy of students and
faculty. Historically, pre-FIPPA practices on campus that compromised personal privacy
included leaving unattended assignments in hallways bearing student names, numbers,
and grades, which led to stalking, identity theft, or plagiarism (as persons passing by
picked out the best assignments). FIPPA and PHIPA also outlined situations in which
counsellors, professors, or campus security can disclose private personal and institu-
tional information, for example if a  student is psychologically vulnerable or if there is
the potential for violence on campus. this example, in particular, points to the tension
in the legislation between protection and disclosure of personal information. Subsequent
events show that the legislation in Canada, and similar legislation elsewhere, has been
poorly interpreted, in routine situations but particularly in times of crisis.
Privacy defined: An impossible paradox?
Deﬁnitions of privacy have a long and varied history, since antiquity (Aristotle: browne,
1882). Since that time privacy practices have been described by anthropologists (Mead,
1953), contemporary philosophers (DeCew, 1997, 2008; Habermas, 1991), political sci-
entists (bennett & Raab, 2006), legal experts (branscomb, 1994; Warren & brandeis,
1890), and communication scholars (Rauhofer, 2008; Shade, 2008). DeCew (2008)
speculates that “there is no single deﬁnition or analysis or meaning of the term” (n.p.).
Some economists, for example Posner (1981), argue that access to certain information
diminishes its value, and that concealment or disclosure of personal information is
frequently for personal gain. Some feminists, for example MacKinnon (1989), point
out that privacy, especially when domestic violence is kept private, can be detrimental
to women’s safety.
the inﬂuence of new media technologies further complicates the meanings of
privacy. Issues related to precursors to today’s ICts were ﬁrst tentatively addressed
more than a  century ago in an often-quoted essay by Warren and brandeis, “the Right
to Privacy,” published in the Harvard Law Review (1890). the article points out:
[t]hat the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a
principle as old as the common law; but it has often been found necessary
from time to time to deﬁne anew the exact nature and extent of such protec-
tion  …. [R]ecent inventions and business methods call attention to the next
step which must be taken for the protection of the person  … the right ‘to be
let alone.’ 
the “recent inventions and business methods” Warren and brandeis refer to
are “instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise,” and what we now might
call the “tabloids.” the foundation of their argument is that new media devices (in
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their case cheap Kodak cameras, then a  recent invention) in the hands of careless
or malicious people can cause harm to reputations by breaching privacy. More re-
cently, Solove (2007) cites examples of the harm that can be done to reputations
when privacy is breached by journalists, bloggers, or students with cellphone cam-
eras on campus.
Not only can people be wronged when their privacy is breached by others, but peo-
ple also breach their own privacy by disclosing very personal information, particularly
when using new media. My research shows that students and faculty are harmed by
others and that they harm themselves by giving up private information for online pur-
chases and social networking without considering what negative consequences might
occur, such as third parties gaining access to private information for bullying (bryce,
2009), marketing purposes (Micheti, burkell, & Steeves, 2010), scams, or identity theft.
“Reasonable” expectations of privacy
In accordance with legislation such as FIPPA, Ontario common law judicial decisions
rely on the “reasonableness” of privacy expectations and the value to public interest
of information being disclosed. because “reasonable” is never clearly deﬁned (in
law or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, for example), its meaning shifts
as social norms and practices change. twenty years ago few students or faculty on
campus would have thought it “reasonable” for closed-circuit tV (CCtV) surveil-
lance to be as ubiquitous as it is today. Since the introduction of social networking
sites, it has become “unreasonable” to expect privacy if one is photographed at
a  campus party while intoxicated, since photographs of the indiscretion can be easily
distributed online. It is also “unreasonable” to expect privacy if one commits an in-
decent act in a  public place under surveillance by CCtV, whether one knows about
the camera or not. the awareness that there is likely no “reasonable” expectation
of personal privacy in any space, private or public, is one of the strongest arguments
for personal discretion. Students’ disregard for privacy is the leading cause of harm
to their reputations, particularly when background checks are conducted by human
resources personnel (brandenburg, 2008; Solove, 2007). On the other hand, both
PHIPA and FIPPA specify that it is “reasonable” to disclose private information in
the public interest. In extraordinary circumstances it is in the public interest to name
a  minor in order to solve a crime, or to name a  potentially dangerous or emotionally
“at-risk” student on campus.
When Sun Microsystems CEO Scott McNealy said, “you have zero privacy anyway.
Get over it” (Sprenger, 1999), he was referring to how vulnerable ICts are to hacking
and how third-party appropriation of personal information diminishes guarantees to
privacy. but to show why there are even fewer “reasonable expectations” of privacy,
despite privacy legislation, I want brieﬂy to consider surveillance in the light of laws
such as section  215 of the USA Patriot Act, the European Union Cybercrime law, and
the still-to-be determined Canadian “lawful access” legislation. “Lawful access” allows
state authorities to secure private personal information, such as email and online
searches, for “security” reasons.
All of these laws challenge Warren and brandeis’ concept of the “right to be let
alone.” At this writing the Conservative Canadian government’s “lawful access” legis-
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lation entitled Investigative Powers for the 21st Century (IP21C) is in limbo, after Par-
liament was prorogued in December 2009.5 IP21C was introduced after earlier efforts
by the Liberals to create a  similar law, in response to pressure from other international
efforts (Dowding, 2005; Geist, 2009). IP21C would demand that Internet service
providers (ISPs, including university information technology services) surrender to
police all subscribers’ personal information, without clear justiﬁcation, and without
anyone necessarily knowing that they are under suspicion or why. IP21C could also re-
quire ISPs to preserve data that users have saved on their system.
Although Canadians do not yet have “lawful access” legislation, equivalent to other
countries, we have been subject to U.S. “lawful access,” under the Patriot Act, introduced
in 2001. President Obama signed legislation to continue the Patriot Act, unchanged, in
early 2010. that legislation impinges on us whenever information crosses the border
due to legally binding obligations to share “trans-border data ﬂows.” Multilateral agree-
ments, in NAFtA or others arrived at through the World trade Organization (WtO),
for example, have been negotiated to control banking, trade, and international money-
laundering crime. the U.S. surveillance apparatus, in the guise of the Patriot Act, indi-
cates that great vigilance is required to maintain the privacy of our personal information. 
An example of how the Patriot Act affects Canadian campuses is the controversy
surrounding RefWorks. According to its website, RefWorks, “an online research man-
agement, writing and collaboration tool—is designed to help researchers easily gather,
manage, store and share all types of information, as well as generate citations and bib-
liographies” (http://www.refworks.com). Controversy arose when it was revealed that
Canadian electronic academic records stored on U.S. computer servers were subject to
section  215 of the Patriot Act, which breached, at least, Canadian universities’ trust in
their relationship with the U.S. security apparatus. While using RefWorks to ease the
burden of research sounds promising, the U.S. surveillance apparatus, working under
the aegis of the Patriot Act, could also (through RefWorks) “easily gather, manage, store
and share all types of information” in an attempt to ﬁnd research being conducted
about sensitive issues such as terrorism. Canadian academic research, undertaken
through RefWorks, was subject to unwarranted searches by the United States. Given
the secrecy of section  215 of the Patriot Act, we may never know what kinds of searches
the FbI undertook (ACLU, 2006).
Once librarians and faculty in Canadian universities and colleges realized that pri-
vacy related to campus activities was potentially under attack, during the period of
2006-07 many academic institutions abandoned the U.S. server and created a  Canadian
equivalent, at the University of toronto, where Canadian searches are now stored (al-
though that move may be moot, given the revival of Canadian “lawful access” legisla-
tion). In light of the RefWorks incident and the Patriot Act’s impact in general, concern
for privacy welfare can be felt anywhere outside the United States, including on On-
tario’s university campuses.
Giving up privacy on campus: Students and social networks
Research into transformed international privacy regulation is important because of
the chilling effect of the Patriot Act and legislation like it. but privacy on campus has
also been affected by social networking sites (SNSs). the work of two cyberspace schol-
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ars, John Palfrey (see Coutu, Joerres, Fertik, Palfrey, & boyd, 2007) and Patricia Sanchez
Abril (2007), is particularly informative about university students’ attitudes to privacy.
Palfrey’s work on SNSs introduced the concept of young “digital natives” (undergrad-
uate students, for example) who have lived with the newest media all their lives and
“digital immigrants,” such as aging academics, who have adapted to new ICts. Sanchez
Abril critiques Palfrey’s work by pointing out that many students are not, in fact, tech
savvy, and many octogenarians are completely plugged in. both scholars, however, ad-
dress SNSs as critical agents in privacy research, on one hand providing a  new form of
community, and on the other hand providing a  new opportunity for carelessness and
moral panic.
Whether people are new media “natives” or “immigrants,” maintaining control
over privacy on SNSs is difﬁcult, especially because new ones are invented so often
and privacy settings are difﬁcult to negotiate, due to their length and legalese. Although
the technologically savvy “natives” may be coming to campus with more intensive
online experience than faculty, it is often narrower experience with games and SNSs.
the older “immigrants” are more than likely to have a  better sense of the cost-beneﬁt
“minimax” factor developed by Mill (1843; 1956), by which people attempt to maximize
their social beneﬁts and minimize their social cost. the student “natives” will also
bring to campus less awareness of what VanLear (1987) calls “self-disclosure reciproc-
ity,” also related to the cost-beneﬁt value of degrees of social engagement. the “immi-
grants” have, at least, experienced more social behaviour in general and are, therefore,
more wary of online dangers and the value of limited self-disclosure. In their relatively
brief encounters with privacy in day-to-day life, the student “natives” have been sub-
ject to greater attempts at online privacy invasion than any other generation. Popular
online cyber worlds such as barbie.com (launched 2001), Webkinz (launched 2005),
and Neopets (launched 1999) are, in part, to blame. to enter these cyber worlds, chil-
dren give up a  great deal of personal information. And although the sites may have
privacy policies, they are often difﬁcult for children and teens to understand, as pointed
out by Micheti, burkell, and Steeves (2010). 
Since Neopets was launched in 1999, millions of undergraduate students entering
university now have had more than 10  years to become accustomed to giving up their
private, personal information willingly. Students who “graduate” to social networking
sites such as MySpace (launched 2003) and Facebook (launched 2004) might bring
with them the kind of trust (or naïve commitment) they developed through their ear-
lier online experiences and disclose more sensitive information about themselves than
they realize. 
Evidence points out that, while there are, indeed, savvy online “natives,” they
have trouble understanding what information is true in cyberspace, as a  recent report
supported by the John  D. and Catherine  t. MacArthur Foundation indicates. Editors
Andrew  J. Flanagan and Miriam  J. Metzger’s Kids and Credibility: An Empirical Exami-
nation of Youth, Digital Media Use, and Information Credibility (2010) shows that for
young people it is where information is found that makes it credible, even if it is iden-
tical in both sources. this suggests that if a  young person is asked to submit personal
information on the credible sites, he or she is more likely to do so there rather than on
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a  site considered to be less reliable.  Characteristics of credible websites include a web
address (URL) that ends with a recognizable “sufﬁx” (for example: .com; .ca; .edu). A
credible website will have legitimate contact information and let the reader know its
true purpose. If a site asks for payment, offers something that is “too good to be true,”
or asks for more of your personal information than you are comfortable giving up, it
may well not be legitimate. If your search has led you to “advertorial” opinion, and
you were looking for “facts,” you may question its authority and legitimacy. 
Surveillance, security, and reputation
Given that Net “natives” may not worry about the potential dangers of online activity,
it is not surprising that many students in the focus groups I conducted do not worry
about closed-circuit tV or other It surveillance on campus. their proﬁles and favourite
behaviour are already known to the world through SNSs. Campus security at many
universities plan to increase CCtV coverage to virtually blanket the campus. Are such
security efforts appropriate—and do such challenges to privacy change (or control)
behaviour on campus? that depends on whom you ask, as Jeffrey  R. young points out
in “Smile! you’re on Campus Camera” (2003).6 building on the work of James Rule
from the 1970s, the Surveillance Studies Centre at Queen’s University (Kingston, On-
tario), directed by David Lyon, has undertaken research on the subject on society-wide
surveillance since the 1990s. In  The Electronic Eye: The Rise of the Surveillance Society
(1994), Lyon cites Rule as well as foundational works on surveillance, such as Jeremy
bentham’s all-seeing “panopticon” (1995), Michel Foucault’s (1995) response to it, Or-
well’s 1984 (1949), and Margaret Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale (1989), all of which have
set the “standard” of fear of surveillance for older readers. Lyon is part of a  research
group, the Surveillance Camera Awareness Network (SCAN, based at Queen’s), that
published A Report on Camera Surveillance in Canada (2009). the report analyzes the
perceived need for and deployment of CCtV and, signiﬁcantly, reveals the relationship
between CCtV and privacy regulation.
In my courses and focus groups, students typically respond to queries about sur-
veillance technologies by saying that if they have done nothing wrong, there is nothing
to fear. but that answer is only viable in a  culture of complete social stasis. If students
never worsen their behaviour and surveillance remains the same, and if expectations
of appropriate behaviour do not change, students may really have “nothing to fear.”
So far, despite new media, behaviour has not changed much, given students’ willing-
ness to appear in compromising situations at campus parties that later appear on
CCtV, youtube, or Facebook, situations that are potentially available forever—and
are often searched for by human resources departments when graduates apply for jobs
(brandenburg, 2008). 
both provincial and federal privacy commissioners have shown their concern
about SNS privacy policies and practices. In 2009, Ontario’s information and privacy
commissioner, Ann Cavoukian, published a  report on her website that encourages
young people to “consider the ‘5 Ps’ (Predators, Parents, Professors [teachers], Prospec-
tive Employers, and Police” when they are posting messages online. Since the summer
of 2009, federal privacy commissioner Jennifer Stoddart has been investigating Face-
book’s privacy settings and publicizing the company’s lack of clarity in explaining how
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it handles personal information. However, while privacy commissioners work to keep
personal information secure, they also interpret FIPPA and PHIPA to urge the disclo-
sure of personal health records in certain situations. by doing so, they point to some
of the paradoxes inherent in the legislation.
“Healthy” disclosure
Health records are usually considered sacrosanct. However, in questions of life and
death, should university ofﬁcials and others attain access to personal health infor-
mation? Is the privacy of a student who is of age jeopardized if health ofﬁcials dis-
close his or her fragile psychological condition (which may portend self-harm or
harm to others) to university authorities, police, or family, despite the student’s
“right to be let alone”? Legislation and recent experiences on campuses make it clear
that divulging such private information to persons not usually legally allowed to see
it is not only possible but also sometimes required in particular circumstances, as
outlined below. 
At the time of writing the most signiﬁcant campus incident that might have been
averted by disclosing a  student’s psychological condition was the 2007 Virginia tech
massacre. the Virginia tech shooter, Cho Seung-Hui, had a  history of threatening be-
haviour on campus. Some students, health ofﬁcials, faculty, and senior administration
already knew about that behaviour, but no group or individual acted on that knowl-
edge. the administration was blamed by the media for prizing Cho’s privacy over con-
cerns for security. but respect for Cho’s privacy, itself, was not to blame. the Virginia
state governor’s Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel points to insufﬁcient awareness
of what could have been done to coordinate campus security, health ofﬁcials, and po-
lice. Section  5 of the report, “Information Privacy Laws,” says:
the widespread perception is that information privacy laws make it difﬁcult
to respond effectively to troubled students. this perception is only partly cor-
rect. Privacy laws can block some attempts to share information, but even
more often may cause holders of such information to default to [a] nondis-
closure option—even when laws permit the option to disclose. Sometimes
this is done out of ignorance of the law, and sometimes intentionally because
it serves the purpose of the individual or organization to hide behind the pri-
vacy law. A  narrow interpretation of the law is the least risky course, notwith-
standing the harm that may be done to others if information is not shared.
(Virginia, Ofﬁce of the Governor, 2007, p.  63)
the treatment of health information on Ontario campuses is governed, in part,
by the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA), which immediately ap-
plied to universities when it was enacted in 2004. It includes a section entitled “Dis-
closure,” cited here in part.
A health information custodian may disclose personal health information
about an individual if the custodian believes on reasonable grounds that the
disclosure is necessary for the purpose of eliminating or reducing a  signiﬁcant
risk of serious bodily harm to a  person or group of persons. (Ontario, PHIPA,
2010, c.  3, Sched.  A, s.  40[1])
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FIPPA also includes a “Disclosures” section, which allows private personal infor-
mation to be released:
(g) where disclosure is to an institution or a law enforcement agency in
Canada to aid an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement
proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely to result;
(h) in compelling circumstances affecting the health or safety of an individual
if upon disclosure notiﬁcation thereof is mailed to the last known address of
the individual to whom the information relates;
(i) in compassionate circumstances, to facilitate contact with the spouse, a
close relative or a friend of an individual who is injured, ill or deceased. (On-
tario, FIPPA, 2010, s.  42[1])
In 2005, Cavoukian made it clear how privacy should be dealt with during times
of crisis in a “Fact Sheet” on the commission’s website. the “Fact Sheet” is derived di-
rectly from PHIPA. In it Cavoukian notes that “Custodians of Information” are permit-
ted to, and may not have a  legal duty to, make available personal information usually
kept private, under the following circumstances. All four are relevant to Virginia tech
as well as to incidents in Canada:
1. Public Interest and Grave Hazard.
2. Health and Safety of an Individual/Risk of Serious Harm to a Person or
Group.
3. Disclosures to Public Health Authorities.
4. Compassionate Circumstances [reporting to parents a  student’s psycholog-
ical condition, for example]. (Cavoukian, 2005)
Institutional policy and provincial and national legislation in Canada (and the
U.S.), then, make it clear that “Custodians of Information” (university registrars and
campus health ofﬁcials, for example) are responsible for and can justify reporting im-
pending danger to police or campus security without fear of repercussions for breach-
ing private information.
Such disclosures apply not only to mass endangerment but also to the protection
of the individual, for example, in cases such as the suicide of a  Carleton University stu-
dent whose body was found in Ottawa’s Rideau River in 2008 (Simons & Walsh, 2010).
the student’s parents were not advised that she was taking antidepressants and speak-
ing to a  counsellor (tam, 2008).7 Cavoukian, with former british Columbia privacy
commissioner David Loukidelis (Cavoukian & Loukidelis, 2008), prepared a toolkit
entitled Practice Tool for Exercising Discretion: Emergency Disclosure of Personal Infor-
mation by Universities, Colleges and Other Educational Institutions (which cites the inci-
dents in Ontario and Virginia, concluding that “life trumps privacy, and our laws reﬂect
that” (p.  1; emphasis in the original). Since 1994, Ann Cavoukian and her colleagues
have conducted annual educational presentations on campuses throughout Ontario.
“teaching” privacy through such policy advice and in the classroom, as suggested by
students in the focus groups discussed below, would help to clarify the implications
of privacy policy and disclosure.
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Focus group responses
the incidents cited above and my observations of the introduction of FIPPA led me to
conduct a series of focus groups on two quite different Southern Ontario campuses in
2008-09. In agreement with Parsons’ (1995) argument that “[c]ritical policy analysis
advocates a fundamental and far-reaching shift towards a more open decision-making
process and the empowering of citizens” (p.  444), I began with the following optimistic
assumptions:
1. the legislation was perceived to be necessary by faculty.
2. Students would understand and appreciate the intention of FIPPA.
3. Given that universities are devoted to teaching and the dissemination of
knowledge and the introduction of FIPPA had been carried out through a
comprehensible and well-organized process.
4. Focus group participants would be well enough informed to contribute to
policymaking on their campuses.
Focus group procedures 
For my analysis procedure I used qualitative narrative analysis (Kaplan, 1993) to arrive
at conclusions about privacy policy on campus that will lead to understanding what
people know, or do not know, about the beginning, middle, and end of the privacy
“story” and how to interpret their role in the story. the study included separate groups
of faculty and students from two different-sized universities. I chose the participants
using “known-group” sampling (Hocking, Stacks, McDermott, 2003), in which partic-
ipants are all from the same group (or institution, in this case), and “snow-ball”
(p.  210) sampling, in which I asked each potential participant to recommend others,
until I arrived at a suitable number from a  variety of disciplines (six or seven, depend-
ing on participant availability, among other considerations, according to Morgan &
Scannell, 1998). However, at the larger university, where there were fewer strong ties
among faculty, sending emails and approaching persons in their ofﬁces was necessary. 
I adopted Maclean’s magazine terms to describe the universities:8 one is a  “Primar-
ily Undergraduate University” with approximately 12,000 students largely in the hu-
manities and social sciences. the other is a “Comprehensive University,” with roughly
30,000 students in a  variety of professional, humanities, and social science depart-
ments. I  visited each campus and asked focus group members a  series of questions
that ranged from what constitutes “good privacy,” or “good privacy on campus,” to
questions about what constitutes a  breach of privacy and how they would respond to
such a  breach of trust. I asked whether participants have become more conscientious
about their privacy since FIPPA was adopted. I also asked them whether they know
how to ﬁnd out about their institution’s privacy policy, and who would interpret it for
them. And I inquired how engaged they are about privacy on campus. (the appendix
at the end of this article lists the foundational questions; others arose as the focus
groups were conducted.) From the 80  pages of transcripts, I present and interpret here
some of the most intriguing or informative focus group responses.
Misunderstanding FIPPA 
From my ﬁndings it became evident that the ﬁrst introductions to FIPPA by the uni-
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versity confused faculty and students alike. the most immediate effect for faculty was
that they were required to desist from posting students’ names, numbers, or grades
publicly—in an attempt to limit stalking and identity theft, for example. but many
faculty members were also under the impression that they could no longer say stu-
dents’ names in class, take attendance, or pass around sign-up sheets for presentations.
Most faculty members had been on campus long enough to have experienced the be-
fore-and-after effect of FIPPA’s deployment. their replies to the focus group questions
reveal obvious commonalities. but faculty responses also vary, according to their dis-
ciplines, the size of their institution, and their engagement in university policy. Stu-
dents in both focus groups at both universities displayed considerable naïveté about
the effects of technology on their privacy. Almost all students and faculty concurred
that trust and privacy are inextricably connected.
the Primarily Undergraduate University, where the ﬁrst focus group was con-
ducted, is, like a small town, inhabited by a  wary, not entirely trusting population, es-
pecially of faculty, who all know each other personally. In response to the ﬁrst
question—“What is good privacy?”—most faculty replied that they want control of
their personal information and choice about what to disclose, in keeping with FIPPA’s
intentions, although only a  few knew much about the legislation itself. A  biologist
added that she wants to control “everything emanating from me  … physical, medical,
blood.” In replying to question  2—“What is good privacy on campus?”—one  faculty
member, who had suffered personal trauma because of a  careless graduate student’s
public relating of their professional relationship, hoped people on campus would re-
spect and maintain the privacy between faculty and student, as one would between
a  patient and client (that is, in a  professional relationship one should be very cautious
with “disclosures”). A  librarian, who cited the RefWorks case (previously discussed),
noted that the basic tenet of librarianship is to keep clients’ research and identity pri-
vate. Everyone concurred with a  sociologist who observed that “we are a small school
in a small community  … Information ‘bleeds’ off campus.”
Question  3 asked: “think back to the last time you felt your privacy on campus
was jeopardized. Did it cause you to change your privacy behaviour or ask others to
change theirs? What kinds of problems did you encounter?” In answering this ques-
tion, a  faculty member found that damaging, threatening, ill-informed gossip about
sensitive research on others’ sexuality had spread quickly around the university. When
the faculty member asked for assistance in controlling the rumours, it became evident
that the university did not (or would not) offer assistance to control the problem by,
at least, calling for civility regarding sensitive information. Most participants recalled
similar lack of conﬁdentiality among colleagues and students.
When I asked faculty to explain their responses to FIPPA, there were universal ex-
pressions of bitter disappointment about how poorly the legislation had been intro-
duced. As a result, there was at least a  year of confusion about when it was permissible
to record and disclose names in class. When asked if they knew how to obtain infor-
mation about privacy on campus, only a  few participants knew there is privacy infor-
mation online, or in any form, at their institution. No one knew about the existence
of the university privacy ofﬁcer or their identity; most did not know about Ontario’s
22 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 36 (1)
information and privacy commissioner, Ann Cavoukian.
the students at the Primarily Undergraduate University, like their faculty coun-
terparts, all knew each other. the generational differences between the students and
faculty were truly fascinating. the questions “What is good privacy” and “What is
good privacy on campus?” drew virtually the same answers—as though they were
both about campus. that is, to the students, campus is their life. One marked difference
between faculty and students was the students’ constant but not altogether positive
linkages between technology and privacy. One student, who uses Facebook and shops
online, revealed her limited experience with self-disclosure reciprocity (VanLear, 1987,
described above) by saying: “It’s just creepy to know somebody you don’t know knows
more about you than your name.”
In response to the question “think back to the last time you felt your privacy on
campus was jeopardized. Did it cause you to change your privacy behaviour or ask
others to change theirs?” two students recalled how their student debit cards were
compromised but did not know what behaviour to change. A  student said, “I don’t
want anybody to know my student number or grades,” and another said, “When at-
tendance sheets go round you have to write your student number  … I wonder if any-
body could do anything knowing my name and student number  … it’s the students
I’d have an issue with.” In  spite of this anxiety about what other students might be
able to do with their student identiﬁcation, the students agreed that they trust profes-
sors with their personal information. All of the students concurred that the legislation
had not been explained well. One exclaimed that “there was no pamphlet, the profs
had all become annoyed about it.…. Aren’t profs our guardians of privacy?” they
agreed that email, pamphlets, and the student newspaper were the best ways to hear
about privacy legislation, but not one student had seen a  detailed article about privacy
on campus published in the student newspaper not long before. Not one student
wanted to navigate the university’s website to locate appropriate information, claiming
the site is too confusing. Few of them knew or cared about computer privacy settings.
Were these students the so-called tech savvy “digital natives” we keep hearing about?
Or were these “text savvy” students who, in a  way, were digital immigrants, but differ-
ent kinds of immigrants than their professors?
When I spoke with faculty members at the Comprehensive University (30,000
students), I was struck by the diffuse campus culture and non-homogenous makeup
of the professors and by the fact that no one knew anyone else in the group. However,
they all agreed with the ﬁrst participant’s statement that “[p]rivacy protects people’s
private information when there’s no compelling reason that it should be made public.”
the second question—“What is good privacy on campus?”—provoked a  variety of
replies, including a  common thread of respect for others’ privacy in general. but one
comment from a  humanities professor that “student transcripts should be available
to faculty, although no one should speak openly about grades” caused an engineer to
recall that, in his undergraduate years in India, grades along with names and student
numbers were announced in class. He was comfortable with that and said, “Different
cultures look at privacy differently.”
In addition to diverse views on privacy, there was also a variation in familiarity
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with the legislation. An English professor had independently attended an off-campus
training workshop not sponsored by the university. the rest of the humanities faculty
members knew nothing about the legislation. they said they would welcome a  website
for students, staff, and faculty, as one said, “so we can know the rules by which we are
supposed to play.”
Question  7, asking participants whether they would attend a  workshop about pri-
vacy on campus, prompted a  split response. three participants did not think they
would have time to attend a  workshop. the English professor would deﬁnitely attend
because she had heard at her original workshop that privacy on campus would be
driven by case law, over time. A librarian, alluding to librarianship’s “basic tenets” of
privacy, agreed she would attend as well. One of the humanities professors would want
to attend, to learn “more about how to respect the privacy of others.” the ﬁnal ques-
tion, asking what participants would like to see in a proposed website, prompted sev-
eral innovative responses. the English professor suggested all Ontario campus privacy
sites should be linked. the librarian suggested different types of sites for different
users—“staff, faculty, students, librarians, because different users have different needs.”
I directed one last question to the engineer. “What would you do to keep other
engineers from using an invention you were developing before you had it patented or
on the market?” He said that, because he works with graduate students, he usually
has a  discussion with them about privacy and the security of research and develop-
ment when they are working on a project. “there’s no ambiguity,” he said. “the whole
thing about academia is to share knowledge. but there has to be a certain amount of
trust [about privacy]. It’s an ethical issue.”
the student focus group at the larger Comprehensive University was composed
of humanities and urban planning students. they agreed that good privacy is respect
for knowing the limits of disclosing information—and how not respecting the limits
could cause physical and emotional harm. the humanities students, however, were
worried about how to understand the legislation more clearly. “the most private
should be the default,” one student said. A  humanities student also assumed that with
the FIPPA legislation, “quite a  lot of good privacy rules are in place.” Another presumed
that “if our privacy is invaded we’ll have something to fall back on.” In replying to
question  3, about their own privacy being jeopardized and changes in behaviour, one
of the humanities students recalled that unknown students had invaded her residence
room while she was sleeping—but, fortunately since it was no more than a  prank, no
harm was done. When asked if that changed her privacy behaviour, she said she would
consider, at least, locking her door. Another humanities student asked, “Isn’t privacy
on campus legislation about intellectual stuff? that’s huge.” And referring to the resi-
dence room incident he asked, “What about the invasion of physical space?”9
Question  5 asked participants whether they had heard that legislation designed
to guarantee privacy on campus had been implemented and what they would want
to know about it. An urban planning student observed that “privacy is an ongoing
process,” and asked what repercussions there would be if personal privacy had been
violated. A  humanities student asked how the legislation deﬁnes privacy, to which I
replied by alluding to DeCew’s (2008) view that “there is no single deﬁnition or analy-
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sis or meaning of the term.” both students agreed that privacy is a  kind of “taxonomy”
based on case history, economics, and context. In other words, they observed, opinions
about privacy change over time, for many reasons.
With question  6—“there are a lot of ways to get information about privacy and
privacy on campus. What do you think is the best way to get that information? How
would you like to get it?”—the conversation turned to technology again. One partici-
pant said that, because all students frequent websites, that would be the simplest way
to access privacy information. but then she said, almost surprised, “the Internet brings
another level of privacy concerns into it,” which prompted another discussion about
how “tech savvy” the students felt they were. the ensuing conversation addressed
concerns similar to those at the Primarily Undergraduate University about how much
the students knew about the technology they use. An urban planning student reverted
to the poster idea suggested at the Primarily Undergraduate University. A  student in
humanities insisted, “I need a  personal level—someone to speak to us during frosh
week or the ﬁrst days of classes.” When this student was asked about her motivation
to engage in privacy issues, she registered despair about Facebook. “Sometimes I won-
der if this really matters because I feel people are going to ﬁnd out somehow, some
way, everything about you.” Most of the participants agreed that they would be moti-
vated to follow the issue of privacy on campus if they could be convinced that privacy
is a  right, a  concept that, as DeCew (2008) points out, is frequently challenged.
All of the student participants agreed that a  website dedicated to privacy on cam-
pus should include examples of adverse repercussions of privacy violations. they
wanted to know to whom they could turn on campus if a  privacy breach occurred. I
told them there was a  campus privacy ofﬁcer, as mandated in FIPPA. Not one of the
participants knew about that person or ofﬁce on campus.
the focus groups altered the earlier assumptions with which I embarked upon
my research. 
1. the legislation was perceived to be necessary by faculty.
2. Students would understand and appreciate the intention of FIPPA.
3. Given that universities are devoted to teaching and the dissemination of
knowledge, FIPPA had been carried out through a comprehensible and
well-organized process.
4. Focus group participants would be well enough informed to contribute to
policymaking on their campuses.
As a result of the implementation of FIPPA, many inappropriate practices, such
as posting student names and numbers, were ended. However, my research suggests
that:
1. Some faculty had not heard about the legislation at all; most of those who
had did not fully understand it; and some were still not following all of
FIPPA’s requirements.
2. Students knew very little about the legislation and were quite uninformed
about privacy in general.
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3. the implementation of FIPPA was not organized well enough to have
helped the faculty and students to understand the purpose and meaning
of FIPPA and why it was deployed.
Suggested solutions to the problem
below are some recommendations made by the focus group members about privacy
on campus and the way FIPPA should be revisited annually. First is the problem, in-
troduced mostly by students, regarding the simultaneous public disclosure of their
name and student number. On the whole, this issue has been dealt with in sensible
ways, such as disaggregating names from numbers on posted or circulated lists, al-
though some students claimed they continued to provide unnecessary personal infor-
mation out of habit. Nearly all of the students were in favour of a  dedicated privacy
website. the students at the “Primarily Undergraduate University” had some novel
ideas about using a multimedia approach to alert fellow students to the site—begin-
ning with a large poster of an eye, displayed throughout campus, changed periodically
to gradually include text and the website’s URL. 
the focus group responses also spoke to trust by faculty that colleagues and stu-
dents would keep personal issues private; trust by faculty that colleagues and graduate
students would keep unpublished research private; and trust by students that their
professors keep their personal information private. In closing conversations, students
and faculty generally agreed that privacy policy and legislation should be “taught” at
some point(s) during their university career, either as part of their introduction to
campus life, as formal courses, or in workshops.
Everyone wished to see a series of “clear, humane, and ethical” privacy guidelines
on a  website or in some other format. Most participants agreed that it is best to have
well-known or “visible” privacy ofﬁcers on campus to maintain discretion and be di-
rectly responsible for addressing inappropriate privacy disclosures in as  limited a  bu-
reaucratic manner as possible.
the engineer’s closing words once again brought together the common thread
relating privacy to trust, in legislation, policy, and personal relationships on campus—
it is necessary for faculty and students to interpret privacy and surveillance in ways
conducive to their own campus cultures. to reiterate the engineer’s words: “there’s
no ambiguity. the whole thing about academia is to share knowledge. but there has
to be a certain amount of trust. It’s an ethical issue.”
Conclusion
there are historic personal tendencies and institutional tensions regarding privacy reg-
ulations that may, over time, be resolved. However, it is difﬁcult to encourage an inter-
est in privacy in the information society without robust legislation, regulation, policies,
and the willingness to “teach” why privacy is necessary and sometimes in jeopardy.
Although some agreement exists about the beginnings of privacy as a  social institution,
the middle and end stages of the narrative are confounded by changing media and
new governance strategies necessary to respond to the changes. Even the most expe-
rienced ICt users and well-informed campus populations are subject to the changing
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norms of privacy—as the necessary paradox of maintaining privacy for the sake of
saving reputations contrasts with breaching privacy for the sake of saving lives.
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Notes
1. the roles of federal and provincial privacy commissioners are similar but somewhat different, given
their responsibilities relative to their federal and provincial legislation. See Ofﬁce of the Privacy Com-
missioner of Canada (OPC) website. 
2. Except for California and Hawaii, the United States has no equivalent state or federal commissioners,
although the Federal trade Commission informs consumers about privacy issues. Many U.S. NGOs
are dedicated to privacy concerns, including the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and the Electronic Pri-
vacy Information Center (EPIC). 
3. Speaking as a policy analyst, Parsons is not referring to the Frankfurt School when he speaks of “crit-
ical theory” but is instead speaking of policy scientists such as Harold Lasswell, whose concerns include
eliminating distortion in policy through rational analysis of goal-oriented actions in complex social
conditions.
4. Parsons’ description, then, justiﬁes acquiring policymaking knowledge in a  variety of ways and from
a  variety of people. I interpreted his conclusion to include focus groups to further my privacy policy
research.
5. All pending legislation being considered by Parliament dies at the end of a session, either through
prorogation or any other reason for the House not to be in session.
6. young interviewed Lauren Gelman, assistant director of Stanford University’s Center for Internet
and Society, who said: “College students are at that age when they’re sort of going out exploring who
they are and who they want to be  … there shouldn’t be a record later in life of what is going on, and
there shouldn’t be a constant surveillance state on campus” (young, 2003).
7. the student’s death was due, in part, to advice she had received to commit suicide on an online chat-
room, in what might be considered the ultimate privacy breach. Michael Melchert-Dinkel, a  former
U.S. nurse, was charged with aiding suicide; see Simons and Walsh (2010).
8. the stringent Ethics Research board requirements at the two universities do not allow me to identify
them.
9. Although the question might best be answered by referring to the Criminal Code of Canada, as an
issue of “break and enter,” the U.K. NGO Privacy International cites such activity as a  breach of “terri-
torial privacy.” (See under “websites”)
Websites
barbie.com. http://www.barbiemedia.com
Canada. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (OPC). About us. http://www.priv.gc.ca
/aboutUs/mm_e.cfm#contenttop
Electronic Privacy Information Center (Epic.org). Online guide to privacy resources.
http://epic.org/privacy/privacy_resources_faq.html
Facebook. http://www.facebook.com
Myspace. http://myspace.com
Neopets. http://www.neopets.com
Privacy International. https://www.privacyinternational.org
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. http://www.privacyrights.org
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RefWorks. http://www.refworks.com
Webkinz. http://webkinz-webkins.com
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Appendix: Focus group questions
Privacy on campus
1. What do you consider good privacy? 
2. For you what is good privacy on campus?
3. think back to the last time you felt your privacy on campus was jeopard-
ized. Did it cause you to change your privacy behaviour or ask others to
change theirs? What kinds of problems did you encounter?
4. What helped you or would have helped you most in making changes?
5. Explain to me how you feel about the FIPPA legislation designed to guar-
antee privacy of personal information? 
6. there are a lot of ways to get information about privacy and privacy on
campus. What do you think is the best way to get that information? How
would you like to get it?
7. Suppose a workshop on Privacy on Campus were held. Would you attend?
8. Many of us think it is difﬁcult to stay motivated about issues such as pri-
vacy and privacy on campus. What would motivate you? What would
keep you interested?
9. I am going to develop a Web site and information program about privacy
on campus. As I begin the project what advice do you have for me?
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